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]. RODNEY JOHNSON

The Uniform Disposition of Community Property
Rights at Death Act: Virginia in 1979?
HE presence of community property in the estate
of a Virginia domiciliary poses a series of problems that are being faced with increasing regularity
by a growing number of Virginia attorneys. While
Virginia has always followed the common-law system
of property ownership, Virginia also adheres to the
general rule that " (a) change of domicile from a state
where the community property prevails to a commonlaw state does not affect the community character of
property previously acquired". 1 Thus, although Virginia's common-law system of property ownership
will govern the property rights of married persons
who have moved from a community property state to
Virginia insofar as their future property is concerned,
the laws of the state where the married persons were
domiciled at the time any community property was
acquired will continue to control their vested rights in
this community property as well as their rights in any
after acquired property that is purchased with the
proceeds of or income from this community property.

T

The Magnitude of the Problem
A rough idea of the magnitude of this problem of
"transplanted" community property in Virginia and
the other common-law states can be derived from a
comparison of the great number of Americans who
live in the community-property states with the statistics relating to the mobility of the American people.
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, the eight community-property states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas and Washington contain 21.5% of
the Population of the United States-a total of
46,339,000 individuals. 2 According to this same
source, approximately four to five million persons
moved from these community-property states to other
states during the five-year period 1970-75. 3 How
1 Commonwealth v. Terjen, 197 Va. 596, at 597, 90 S.E.2d
801 (1956).
. 2 Table No.
10 Population-States: 1960 to 1976, and
Table No. 2 Population: 1900 to 1977, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
3 Table No. 46 Mobility Status of the Population: 19701975, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

EDITOR'S NoTE: Professor Johnson and Thomas S. Word,
Jr., Esquire, are the Virginia members of the Committee on
Property Problems of the Migrant Client that was created by
the American Bar Association's Section on Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law.

many of these four to five million persons might have
moved to Virginia during this five-year period is of
course quite speculative. It would be even more speculative to attempt an estimate of the total number of
persons currently domiciled in Virginia who were
domiciled in a community-property state at any time
in the past. However, it can reasonably be assumed
that there are a number of such persons, and it is a
matter of non-debatable law that " ... their change
of domicile ... (did) not affect the community character of property previously acquired" 4 by them and
brought into Virginia.

The Problem Illustrated
The presence of this "transplanted" community
property in Virginia can raise a variety of problems
during the lifetimes of the persons owning such property and this kind of property is almost guaranteed to
cause problems when one of them dies. Let us assume,
for example, the following hypothetical for purposes
of illustrating some of these problems as well as the
suggested legislative response to them. John and Mary
Deaux moved to Virginia some five years ago from
one of the community-property states, where they were
domiciled during the first twelve years of their married
life. John has been employed during the entirety of this
seventeen year period with Sears and Roebuck, starting
off in the stockroom and now the manager of the appliance department in Hometown, Virginia. Mary has
remained at home during the entirety of their married
life and has spent all of her time raising children and
keeping house. Under these facts Mary, the "nonacquiring spouse," would be recognized as having a
present, equal interest in all of the income earned
(and assets purchased therewith) by John, the "ac4

Commonwealth v. Terjen, supra note 1.
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quiring spouse," during the twelve years they lived in
the community property state even though John may
have taken "title" to the assets so acquired in his sole
name. Any property owned by either John or Mary
prior to the marriage or acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance would be classified as
"separate" property in which the other spouse would
have no rights. John and Mary have been reading a
financial planning series in Local Newspaper which
has prompted them to contact Local Lawyer about
the prepartion of a "simple" will for them. First of all,
if neither John nor Mary mentions that some of their
assets were accumulated while they were domiciled
in a community-property state, what is Local Lawyer's
duty in regard to questioning them about past domiciles in order to a<scertain the possible existence of
"tainted" property? Is it malpractice if he doesn't? Let
us assume that John and Mary reveal this information
to Local Lawyer and also inform him that they under-
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stand their rights in connection with the community
property they brought into Virginia five years ago
but, they ask, "How will our various communityproperty assets, common-law assets, and mixed assets
be identified when we die, what are our dispositive
rights in regard to our combined estate, and is there
anything we can do now to eliminate any confusion
and uncertainty when we die?" Let us assume that
John dies and Local Ba:nk qualifies as personal representative on his estate. In the course of its administration, Local Bank discovers that John and Mary
lived in a community property state for twelve years.
Does Local Bank have a fiduciary duty to search out
and discover any possible community property or
assets into which community property can be traced?
Let us assume that John devises the ever popular
Blackacre to his brother, Bob, who wishes to sell
Blackacre to the adjoining landowner, Harry. Consummation of the sale is delayed until one year has
passed from the time of John's death, at the title
company's request, in order to protect Harry from the
possibility of a claim under an after-discovered will.
Three days after the sale is consummated, Mary
brings an action against Harry in which she alleges
that Blackacre was purchased with the proceeds realized upon the sale of community-property assets
shortly after she and John came to Virginia. Therefore, she alleges, Blackacre was community property
at John's death and, although "title" thereto was
taken in John's name alone, John's will devising
Blackacre to Bob only passed John's undivided onehalf interest to Bob in fact and thus she a:nd Harry
are now equal tenants in common of Blackacre. How
does Harry's lawyer respond? How doe5 the lawyer
for Local Bank, that supplied Harry's financing and
took back a purchase-money deed of trust on Blackacre as security for the funds advanced, respond to
this attack on its security? How do the lawyers for the
title insurance company that insured Harry's fee simple title respond if a claim is filed against them? This
listing of hypothetical possibilities could continue on
but it is believed that case has been made, at this
point, for the proposition advanced in the opening
sentence that the presence of community property in
the estate of a Virginian poses a series of problems
that arc being faced with increasrng regularity by a
growing number of Virginia lawyers.

A Partial Solution to the Problem
This series of problems is exacerbated by a complete
lack of answers or even guiding authority in Virginia.

There are no statutes and only one case 5 dealing with
such "transplanted" community property. Of course
Virginia is not alone in suffering these problems associated with "transplanted" community property or in
having little or no authority for their resolution. In
recognition of the widespread nature and importance
of these problems, the American Bar Association's
Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
created the Committee on Property Problems of
the Migrant Client approximately eleven years ago to
study these problems and report accordingly. This
committee's study led it to the formation of a fouryear association with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which resulted
in the promulgation by the NCCUSL of the Uniform
Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death
Act in April, 1971. The Act was approved by the
American Bar Association in February, 1972. 6 The
primary purpose of the Act is "to preserve the rights
of each spouse in property which was community
property prior to change of domicile, as well as in
property substituted therefor where the spouses have
not indicated an intention to sever or alter their
'community' rights." 7 While this primary purpose
has already been accomplished by the VirginiaSupreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Terjen, the adoption of the Act would be quite beneficial
in Virginia because it would provide a number of
answers, guidelines, and presumptions to help resolve
the practical problems that are encountered in administering such property.
What the Act Does Not Do
Prior to a section by section discussion of the Act,
it might be helpful to note at the outset what the Act
"Commonwealth v. Terjen, supra note 1. This case has
been the subject of comment on three occasions and each
writer has concluded that the court erred in its interpretation
of the nature of the rights of married persons under California's community-property system. See De Funiak, Commonwealth v. Terjen; Common Law Mutilates Community
Property, 43 Va. L. Rev. 49 (1957); Moore, Community
Property Problems for the Common Law Lawyer, Estate
Planning in Depth Resource Materials, Vol. 1, p. 625, at
642, ALI/ ABA ( 1977); and Recent Decision, 42 Va. L. Rev.
724 (1956).
6
A more complete treatment of the origin and work of the
Committee on Property Problems of the Migrant Client, as
well as a discussion of the need for the Uniform Act, will be
found in McClanahan, Property Problems of the Migrant
Client-A Statutory Solution, 111 Trusts & Estates 950
( 1972). Mr. McClanahan is Chairman of the Committee.
7
Prefactory Note, page 3, Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act.

does NOT do. First-The Act does not attempt to
deal with any of the problems that may arise during
the lifetime of John and Mary in connection with
their "transplanted" community property. These lifetime problems are thought to be not only of less importance but also of much greater difficulty to deal
with in the context of a Uniform Act and thus they
are not treated. Second-The Act has no effect on the
rights of lifetime creditors of John or Mary as they
present their claims during the post-death period.
Third-The Act does not enlarge the rights of a
surviving spouse in the "transplanted" community
property beyond what they would have been under
the laws of the community property state where the
property in question was originally acquired. Fourth
-The Act has no effect on property acquired by
John and Mary after they become Virginia domiciliaries (except as such property is acquired with the
proceeds of or profits from community property).
Fifth-The Act does not prevent John and Mary
from severing the community property nature of their
previously acquired property and casting ownership
of such prnperty in whatever alternate form they
may desire during their joint lives. As a matter of
fact, the Act would provide a legislative sanction of
such severance which, in tum, would cause the "community" character of the property in question (and
its attendant problems) to cease to exist and the Act,
then, to be no longer applicable.
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
RIGHTS AT DEATH AcT
SECTION 1. [Application.] This Act applies to the disposition at death of the following property acquired by a married person:
( 1) all personal property, wherever
situated:
( i) which was acquired as or became, and remained, community property under the laws of another jurisdiction; or,
(ii) all or the proportionate part
of that property acquired with the
rents, issues, or income of or the proceeds from, or in exchange for, that
community property; or
(iii) traceable to that community
property;
( 2) all or the proportionate part of
any real property situated in this
state which was acquired with the
rents, issues or income of the proceeds
from or in exchange for, property acquired as or which became, and re13

mained, community property under the
laws of another jurisdiction, or property traceable to that community property.
The purpose of Section 1 is to define the property
that is subject to the Act. In recognition of the general principle that the law of a decedent's domicile
controls the disposition of his personal property, regardless of where it may be situated, while the law of
the state where a decedent's real property is located
determines the disposition of such property on the
death of its owner. Section 1 of the Act is divided
into two subsections which provide separate, though
similar, rules for personal property and real property.
Both subsections are controlled by the same policy
considerations; viz., whatever property (a) was acquired as community property, or ( b) though not
so acquired, became community property by agreement of the parties while domiciled in a community
property state, or ( c) was acquired with the income
from community property, or ( d) is property traceable to a community property source, is "property
subject to the Act" unless the spouses have agreed to
the contrary. While both of the subsections would
also require an apportionment of property where a
part of the consideration therefor is community property and the other part of the consideration is separate property, the Act is content to stop at this
statement of policy and leave it to the courts in the
enacting states to determine what the "proportionate
part" should be. This is believed to be a sound
approach because of the large number of differing
factual patterns that can be expected to arise in the
future and the variety of rules that have been developed already in an attempt to do equity under these
differing circumstances. 8
SECTION 2. [Rebuttable Presumptions. J
In ~etermining whether this Act applies to
specific property the following rebuttable
presumptions apply:
. ( 1) property acquired during marnage by a spouse of that marriage while
domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose
laws property could then be acquired as
community property is presumed to have
been acquired as or to have become
and remained, property to which this Ac~
applies; and
( 2) real property situated in this State
and personal property wherever situated
---8
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Moore, op. cit. note 5, supra, at page 631.

acquired by a married person while domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose laws
property could not then be acquired as
community property, title to which was
taken in a form which created rights of
survivorship, is presumed not to be property to which this Act applies.
Section 2 c.ontains several rebuttable presumptions
that are designed to facilitate the application of the
definitions contained in Section 1 and to aid the
court in determining what property in a decedent's
estate is property subject to the Act. Subsection ( 1)
presumes that all property in John's estate which
was acquired while John and Mary were domiciled
in a community property state is in fact community
property. Subsection ( 2) presumes that all Virginia
realty and all personal property wherever located
that was acquired by John while a domiciliary of
Virginia is not property subject to the act if title to
the property in question was taken in the names of
John and Mary with survivorship. It will be obvious
to the most casual reader that there are many situations for which no presumptions have been provided.
The official comments caution us, however, that "no
negative implications were intended to be raised by
lack of inclusion of other presumptions in Section 2;
areas not covered were simply left to the normal
process of ascertainment of rights in property." 9
SECTION 3. [ Dispostion upon Death. J
Upon death of a married person, one-half
of the property to which this Act applies is
the property of the surviving spouse and is
not subject to testamentary disposition by
the decedent or distribution under the laws
of succession of this State. One-half of that
property is the property of the decedent and
is subject to testamentary disposition or distribution under the laws of succession of this
State. With respect to property to which this
Ac~ ai:plies, the one-half of the property
which is the property of the decedent is not
subject to the surviving spouse's right to
elect against the will [and no estate of
dower or curtesy exists in the property of
the decedent. J

Section 3 provides that upon the death of John
one-half of the property to which the Act applies
belongs to Mary. If John dies testate the other onehalf of the property will go to the beneficiaries named
in his will, free from any claims on the part of Mary
9 Prefactory Note, page 4, Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act.

to dower in the realty or a statutory forced share
of the personalty. If John should die intestate, his
one-half will be disposed of according to the statutes
of descent and distribution free from any claim of
dower on the part of Mary. It should be noted, however, that under Virginia intestate succession law, if
John should die without children or descendants of
deceased children surviving him, Mary will be John's
heir 'and distributee and thus will succeed to his onehalf; and, even if John is survived by children or
descendants of deceased children, Mary will still succeed to Y:J of John's personal property as distributee.
SECTION 4. [Perfection of Title of Surviving Spouse.] If the title to any property
to which this Act applies was held by the
decedent at the time of death, title of the
surviving spouse may be perfected by an
order of the [court] or by execution of an
instrument by the personal representative of
the heirs or devisees of the decedent with the
approval of the [court] . Neither the personal representative nor the court in which
the decedent's estate is being administered
has a duty to discover or attempt to discover whether property held by the decedent is property to which this Act applies,
unless a written demand is made by the surviving spouse or the spouse's successor in
interest.

Section 4 provides that if any of the property titled
in John's name at the time of his death is property
subject to the act, Mary's title thereto may be perfected by court order or by deed from John's personal
representative or successors in interest with the approval of the court. 10 Most importantly, however,
from a fiduciary administration standpoint, this section also provides that John's personal representative
has no duty to discover or attempt to discover if any
of the property titled in John's name at the time of
his death is property subject to the Act, unless
Mary makes a written demand upon the personal
representative.
SECTION 5. [Perfection of Title of Personal Representative, Heir or Devisee.] If
the title to any property to which this Act
applies is held by the surviving spouse at the
time of the decedent's death, the personal
representative or an heir or devisee of the
10 It may be preferable to change the reference to "court"
at this point to "commissioner of accounts" in order to conform Section 4 to Virginia probate procedure and to provide
for maximum flexibility.

decedent may institute an action to perfect
title to the property. The personal representative has no fiduciary duty to discover or
attempt to discover whether any property
held by the surviving spouse is property to
which this Act applies, unless a written demand is made by an heir, devisee, or creditor of the decedent.
Section 5, which is a corollary to Section 4, deals
with property that is in Mary's name at John's death
and provides that John's personal representative or
successors in interest may bring an action to perfect
their title to any such property that is property subject to the Act. Again it is provided that John's
personal representative has no duty to discover or
attempt to discover whether any of the property so
titled in Mary's name is property subject to the Act
unless one of John's creditors or successors in interest makes a written demand upon the personal
represen ta ti ve.
SECTION 6. [Purchaser
for Value or
Lender.]
(a) If a surviving spouse has apparent
title to property to which this Act applies, a
purchaser for value or a lender taking a security interest in the property takes his interest in the property free of any rights of
the personal representative or an heir or devisee of the decedent.
( b) If a personal representative or an
heir or devisee of the decedent has apparent
title to property to which this Act applies,
a purchaser for value or a lender taking a
security interest in the property takes his interest in the property free of any rights of
the surviving spouse.
( c) A purchaser for value or a lender
need not inquire whether a vendor or borrower acted properly.
( d) The proceeds of a sale or creation of
a security interest shall be treated in the
same manner as the property transferred to
the purchaser for value or a lender.

Section 6, which is rather clearly designed to protect post-death purchasers for value and lenders, does
so by focusing on apparent title at the time of the
transaction in question. Thus if John held title to any
property subject to the Act at the time of his death,
John's devisee can transfer a perfect title to a purchaser for value even though Mary has placed. the
purchaser on notice of her claim to an interest
therein. Similarly, if paper title to such property is in
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Mary at the time of John's death, Mary has the
power to transfer a perfect title to a purchaser for
value even though such purchaser has notice of the
estate's claim to an interest therein. The comments
to this section emphasize that value is the only requirement for the purchaser to be fully protected.
This "immunity" of a purchaser for value is also
extended to a lender who takes a security interest in
property subject to the Act from a surviving spouse
or successor in interest who has apparent title. The
drafters point out that this approach (a) will permit
reliance on apparent title, (b) will facilitate determination of title and disposition of property where
adequate consideration is paid, and ( c) will merely
continue the inter vivas rule that a spouse with apparent title may transfer perfect title to community
property to a third party who gives value therefor.
While this section intends to facilitate the transfer
of property by protecting the rights of a purchaser
for value or a lender, it is not intended to affect the
rights of Mary and John's successors in interest
among themselves. Thus the section provides that
where such a sale cuts off the rights of these parties
to particular property, the proceeds of the sale shall
stand in the place of the property sold and be subject
to their claims accordingly.
SECTION 7. [Creditor's Rights.] This Act
does not affect rights of creditors with respect to property to which this Act applies.
Section 7 is self-explanatory.
SECTION 8. [Acts of Married Persons. J
This Act does not prevent married persons
from severing or altering their interests in
property to which this Act applies.
Section 8 may be the most important section of the
Act for estate planning purposes because it recognizes
the right of John and Mary to sever the community
nature of their "tainted" property and create any
different form of ownership that would have been
permitted by the laws of the state where they were
domiciled when they originally acquired the property. There is presently a lack of complete agreement
among Virginia lawyers concerning the ability of
married persons to deal with each other in regard to
their rights in each other's property. Thus this section
should prove particularly helpful to estate planners
because of its recognition of the rights of married
Virginians to deal with each other in regard to their
"tainted" property which represents the most troublesome category.
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SECTION 9. [Limitations on T estamentary Disposition.] This Act does not authorize a person to dispose of property by will
if it is held under limitations imposed by
law preventing testamentary disposition by
that person.
Section 9 provides that the Act does not enlarge
John's or Mary's dispositive rights in the "transplanted" community property beyond what they
would have been under the laws of the community
property state where the property in question was
originally acquired.
SECTION 10. [Uniformity of Application
and Construction. J This Act shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with
respect to the subject of this Act among
those states which enact it.
SECTION 11. [Short Title.] This Act may
be cited as the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act.
SECTION 12. [Repeal and Effective
Date. J The following acts and laws are repealed as of the effective date of this Act:

(1)

(2)
Passage of the Act would not require the repeal
of any statutes.
SECTION 13. [Time of Taking Effect.] This
Act shall take effect. ...
It is anticipated that the Act will be introduced
into the 1979 Session of the General Assembly.
Conclusion
It is believed that the Act represents a desirable
addition to Virginia law because it provides valuable
assistance through its definitions, rules, presumptions,
and guidelines (a) to help insure the preservation
of married persons' rights in "transplanted" community property, and (b) to enable Virginia lawyers, fiduciaries, lenders, and title companies to more
effectively perform their roles vis-a-vis such property.
Moreover, in addition to minimizing future litigation
and facilitating the planning and administration of
estates that consist in part of "transplanted" community property, adoption of the Act in Virginia
would achieve a desirable uniformity of treatment of
this area of the law with our sister states.

